1. Scope
Section 47 prohibits a person from acquiring assets of a business or shares if the acquisition has or is likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition in a market.
2. Clearance or authorisation
New Zealand's merger clearance regime is voluntary. It means that parties to a merger are not required to notify the Commission of the merger.
Under Part 5 of the Commerce Act the Commission can review potentially anti-competitive mergers or arrangements:
3. Procedural Rules
There is no Phase I/Phase II distinction in New Zealand. When considering merger clearance applications, the process has the following stages: pre-clearance, the clearance application, the Commission’s investigation and determination, and post-determination (Mergers and Acquisitions Guidelines 2013).
The Act sets out a 40 day statutory timeframe in which the merger must be either cleared or prohibited, unless an alternative timeframe is agreed with the applicant.
Procedural fairness: Throughout the investigation the Commission keeps in regular contact with the applicant about progress (Mergers and Acquisitions Guidelines).
As part of the Commission’s processes, the Commission often issues a Letter of Issues which sets out the Commission’s initial competition concerns and invites submissions from and meetings with the applicant. Where these concerns remain, the Commission sends a Letter of Unresolved Issues, invites submissions and holds a meeting.
4. Assessment
The Commission assesses mergers using the substantial lessening of competition test. This test seeks to determine whether a merger is likely to substantially lessen competition by comparing the likely state of competition if the merger proceeds with the likely state of competition if the merger does not proceed. A lessening of competition is generally the same as an increase in market power – the ability to raise price above the price that would exist in a competitive market (the ‘competitive price’),or reduce non-price factors such as quality or service below competitive levels. Only a lessening of competition that is substantial is prohibited under the Commerce Act. The Commission considers a substantial lessening of competition to be a lessening of competition that will adversely affect consumers in the market in a material way.
The Mergers and Acquisitions Guidelines provide “concentration indicators” and indicate that a merger is unlikely to require a clearance where: the post-merger combined market share of the three largest firms in the market is less than 70% and the combined market share of the merging parties is less than 40%; and/or the post-merger combined market share of the three largest firms in the market is 70% or more and the combined market share of the merging parties is less than 20%.
However, the Guidelines provide that market share is one of the factors considered and not sufficient in itself to establish whether a merger is likely to result in substantially lessening competition.
As to the price increase, the High Court has noted that a price increase of 4-5% provides a general indication regarding a ‘substantial’ lessening of competition.
5. Remedies and sanctions
Under Sections 83, 84 and 85, the Commission may ask the Court to apply an injunction restraining further implementation of a transaction, divestiture of assets or shares and/or a penalty. The High Court decides whether a merger is likely to substantially lessen competition.
According to Section 83, the Court may order a person who has contravened Section 47 to pay a pecuniary penalty as follows:
a) individual: up to NZD 500,000 (approximately USD 355,450)
b) body corporate: up to NZD 5 million (approximately USD 3.55M)
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